America’s Budgetary Challenge

Based on the 1.5% percent noted, the cost to OECD nations cumulatively would exceed $450 billions of dollars annually in narcotics costs. (Based on the total GNP of $30 trillion) Adding the equivalent ‘narcotics cost of terror’ component, would raise the total to $563 billions annually.. This figure includes the United States.

Obviously, were these dollars otherwise available they are most likely to produce a positive return on investment. The $563 billions may be too small a number, for when killers bombs, weapons of mass destruction and governmental corruption are included as a part of the narcotics equation, it becomes difficult to estimate what the total negative costs may be. For example, if narcotics funded the 9/11 terrorists, even in part, the real costs worldwide are monumental.

It is necessary to remind readers again that the two major narcotics crops are opium poppies and coca leaves. They account for over 70% of the worldwide costs of narcotics. For the sake of this conversation, think that as 70% of $563 billion, or $394 billion that can be better utilized once we assure that one day neither plant is sold as a narcotic,

Since the $394 billion includes America’s share, we must subtract the amount attributed to heroin and cocaine in our share from the OECD total. This requires subtracting the $132 billion US total from the $394 OECD total. The result. $262 billion, is the annual amount attributable to the two major drugs throughout the remaining 29 OECD member nations. Once again, the more wealthy of which are the EU nations.

Under the conditions outlined, the resulting $262 billion annually is found money to the recipient nations. If America provides both the means, the diplomacy and the seed monies to curtail cultivation of the two major narcotics producing plants, the $262 billion annually becomes an outright gift to its recipients. What responsibilities, if any, should recipients be willing to take on in return for such a large ‘narcotics dividend?’

Responsibility Related to a Narcotics ‘Dividend’

One possible exercise of responsibility would be using narcotics dividend monies to shrink the Gap while increasing the Core.

Consider two opportunities only: Afghanistan and Colombia.

Afghanistan produces 75% of the world’s opium derived narcotics. Colombia produces 70% of the world’s cocaine derived narcotics (and almost 100% of the heroin used in the United States.).

Consider now, eliminating narcotics plant cultivation in one Gap nation, Colombia. This would produce a narcotics budgetary dividend of approximately $132 billion to one nation, the United States. That is because virtually all of our cocaine and heroin come from Colombia.

Were the US to enjoy a narcotics dividend of $132 billion annually from just one donor, what would America be willing to offer in return, given that they had already appropriated $72 billion annually for their own Social Security and Medicare needs? After all, there is still $60 billion annually that is not yet appropriated.

Obviously, moral as well as economic issues will need consideration.

Self-interest vs. Greed

From the OECD vantage point, considering Afghanistan along with Columbia would produce a dividend to the non-US OECD nations, primarily the EU, of 70% of their relative cocaine costs and 75% of the heroin costs, or as much as $183 billion annually. (70% x $262 billion), Without either plant, therefore, and using just those two producer countries, with both hoping to one day join the Core, the dividend receiving nations would have substantial monies with which to help. Why should narcotics dividend receiving nations, primarily Europeans, do so?

Were the European Core nations generous to the two nations for giving up the cultivation of narcotics, they would have a combined savings of $183 billion annually to do so.

One must step back also to factor the vast differential between cultivation cost and street value of plant-derived narcotics.

For example, the 2004 monetary return to the Afghan economy of this year’s crop of opium poppies is estimated at $2.8 billion. That is 60% of the Afghan GNP. Although that is a lion’s share of the Afghan economy, the street value of Afghanistan’s 75% of the world heroin crop is probably in excess of $230 billion.

In other words, the heroin cost users pay all the accumulated middlemen in the distribution chain is 70+ times greater than the amount generated as GNP to the producer nation. The bulk of the profits do not go to those who grow the plants, but to real criminals: warlords, druglords traffickers, dealers and terrorists. And we needn’t be feeling generous toward this latter group of societal lepers or worry whether or not they are compensated fairly for the loss of the opportunity to exploit others.

What’s the bottom line?

The bottom line is that even if other OECD nations are not generous at all with their $183 billion annual narcotics dividend toward helping Gap nations join the Core, America alone still saves $132 billion annually just from Colombia.

And since the bulk of Middle-Eastern terrorist financing comes from Afghan heroin, we would strike a mighty blow in favor of reducing the means to finance terror against us. Put whatever $ amount you want to this benefit.

We can afford to be both very creative (and generous) in helping poor producer nations to globalize given a found narcotics dividend in the magnitudes discussed. This is found money in spades!

We have already mentioned having $60 billion annually after spending for Social Security reform and the Medicare prescription plan recently enacted.

The best argument we can make is that we offer the Gap producer countries more toward their GNP than they now get for narcotics cultivation. We place ourselves in the best position to accomplish our ends by diplomacy and cooperation rather than by forced eradication. Compensation in place of cultivation allows the producer nation time in order to readjust over a period of years. Since we can make the offer sweeter for not growing narcotic plants the recipient can realize for their cultivation, we strengthen our argument that those in opposition are not the grower side of the equation, but the criminal element.

For example, we might provide support to Colombian and Afghan globalization at $10 billion a year for 10 years and then reduce the grant by $1 billion each year for the next 10 years. That would mean we had supported economic development in each nation to the tune of $155 billion over 20 years. Thereby, Colombia and Afghanistan would have a full generation to become weaned from narcotics. I am not trying to suggest an actual policy decision, but merely to suggest the kind of thinking that might be considered in reaching one. The real bottom line reflects the reality that dividend recipient nations should be forced to face an insurmountable moral dilemma by any refusal to share a part of their largesse with those who produced it.

Coalitions of the Decent

Perhaps ‘coalitions of the decent’ are a better functioning diplomatic umbrella than coalitions of the willing? The United States has been recently subjected to harsh criticism abroad, both in the media and the halls of government. Particularly in the EU, it has been alleged that America thinks only of itself. France has gone so far as saying that America “can’t be depended upon to return a favor.” This is an excellent opportunity to put that accusation to the acid test, to pose the question as to who is willing or not to return favors. That premise has to be put in proper context by defining who best uses the narcotics dividend favor granted them by Americans. We will be able to judge them fairly on this issue by observing how generous they are toward helping narcotics producer nations to become members of a healthy economic world. Decency is a great force in the hands of the decent, but reveals the truth about those who lack virtue. It’s time for the boo-birds to be called to roost.

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